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The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle
East
Abstract
The logic of the American approach to the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria – both
in policy and practice – bears striking resemblance to the U.S. approach to Vietnam in the
1960s and 1970s. Despite policies of restraint, it has proven difficult to stop the inertia of
war, be it against Communism or terrorism. As this inertia grows, so too does illogical
entanglement. Such deepening involvement, whether in Vietnam or the Global War on
Terror, often results in combat forces undertaking nation- and state-building missions that
they are not designed for, yet have been doing for almost two decades.
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Introduction
Towards the end of the Vietnam War, Leslie Gelb published a damning
insider’s view of the way the United States had judiciously created a faulty
foreign policy towards Vietnam. His 1971 analysis brought to bear a terse
view of how American policy toward French Indochina developed over
several decades.1 This policy centered on symbolism, minimal
involvement, and an austere strategy that public opinion tempered.
Current American policy in the greater Middle East region appears to be
no different on three similar points: Symbolic pursuit of globally defeating
all terrorists, waging small wars on the periphery without a fully mobilized
commitment, and a persistent policy of fighting terrorists instead of
dealing with the structural forces that originally created them. In these
ungoverned (or under-governed) areas begging United States involvement
through the years, there has been an expansion in collaborative efforts
between the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD),
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This
so-called 3D spectrum of influence (diplomacy, defense, development)
continues to blur the lines of human and national security such that
seemingly unrelated departments and agencies have taken to a
collaborative effort in advancing national interests.2 Their policies and
practices have ballooned into a quasi-interventionist model that American
political leaders find difficult to reverse course. In short, the American
approach to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) of the 21st century—in both
policy and practice—bears striking resemblance to the United States
approach to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. These policies of minimal
involvement have proven difficult—as described in this article—to stop the
inertia of war, be it against Communism or terrorism.
Four years after South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese and Vietcong
forces, Gelb converted his Foreign Policy article into a book with Richard
Betts in 1979 titled The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Chief
conclusions drawn from this book were that American commitments to
contain Communism were driven by doctrinal beliefs in keeping as many
countries free from Communism (Asia especially) as possible. The
Johnson and Nixon Administrations, respectively, developed policies and
strategies via political and bureaucratic bargaining, creating a foreign
policy with blurry strategic means and ends.3 Similar processes continue
1
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to inform American entanglement in the greater Middle East, as these
policies fail to produce intended political outcomes.4
Gelb’s analysis of Vietnam symbolically fits the narrative of deepening
American entanglement in the Middle East. The United States is
paradoxically committed to fighting terrorism and spreading democratic
values, while trying to maintain some façade of stability in the greater
Middle East. Unfortunately, the clumsy pursuit of terrorists and
insurgents undermines the stability of the region, breeding more terrorism
and anti-American sentiment.5 For instance, an American airstrike in
Mosul that accidentally killed almost 200 civilians does not help win over
citizens in a region that has grown wary of America’s noble motives.6
Contemporary American foreign policy appears to rest on the belief of
maintaining Middle Eastern allies. However, these allied governments
need to rely on patronage to govern, which undercuts domestic legitimacy
and adds to the long-term instability of the region. The national security
bureaucracy pursues such a foreign policy without addressing the
corruption and weak institutions enabling grievances that fuel insurgency
and terrorism. The United States approach also ignores pan-Arab
grievances towards America’s near-blind support for Israel and the
American troops stationed on holy Islamic lands. Indeed, the recent
decision to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem only further
provoked neighbors, polarizing audiences around the sentiment of the
United States behaving selfishly.7
The framework of Gelb’s analysis provides an excellent blueprint for
understanding how the United States stumbled into the Middle East
without a grand strategy. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S.
broadened a war in the Middle East through strategic dithering: Doing
enough to avoid losing, but not committing enough to secure a victory.8
Moreover, the idea of victory has been difficult to pinpoint in Afghanistan
and Iraq, other than vague aspirations for democracy to thrive and some
modicum of self-sufficiency.
Symbolically, preventing the spread of communism motivated fighting in
the Vietnam War while the international community waged the Global
War on Terror (and subsequent tautological terms) in similar vagueness in
hopes of stopping the spread of terrorism.9 Worse yet, much like the
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Vietnam War, the ever-persistent American wars and attempts at nationand state-building in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region,
indicate pursuits by decision-makers to do something. This compels the
foreign policy machine to provide resources to the fight without
identifying a plausible strategic outcome besides doing something and not
losing. This is immensely at odds with Clausewitzian views on war where
the means employed should be toward a specific end. Lastly, it shows that
the goals and means to fight and contain violent non-state actors are
bureaucratically preferable as an institutional form of perseverance. It is
tough (and less glamorous) building credible regimes in the greater Middle
East that do not cultivate environments ripe for insurgency. One only
needs to look at the annual funding disparities any given year between the
United States State Department ($50 billion in 2015) and Department of
Defense ($585 billion in 2015) to see which priorities and goals are more
salient to American leadership.10 The irony is that fighting terrorism while
trying to tame the Middle East are both being pursued by the United
States national security bureaucracy, but through divergent mechanisms
that undermine each other.

An Efficient Pursuit of Terrorism?
United States policy towards fighting terrorists in the War on Terrorism
(known as Overseas Contingency Operations during the Obama era (20092017) with a return to War on Terror phraseology in the Trump
administration is merely a byproduct of bureaucratic pursuits of efficiency
coupled with the tinted ideological lenses of certain elites.11 Each American
president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) has had to accept the
fact that the Middle East is inexorably tied to American interests in the
realm of energy security, given that these economic ties started in the
region when an American oil company discovered oil in Saudi Arabia in
1938.12 In context of energy security, the Dwight Eisenhower
administration exercised this interest as the CIA (with the help of the UK)
overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosaddeq of Iran, due to his attempt at nationalizing the British AngloIranian Oil Company.13 The oil shocks of the 1970s illustrated the sort of
domestic issues caused by disruptions to oil markets emanating from the
Persian Gulf.14 Owing to this, the Jimmy Carter administration formally
codified present and future Middle East region commitments through a
State of the Union address in 1980:
3
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Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.15
Soon after, Carter established a small military contingent in the region,
and only a few years later, the Ronald Reagan administration built up a
new military command structure responsible for the Middle East region.
Carter’s Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force later grew into U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), which was supposed to deal with stability and
security issues in a region ranging west to Egypt, south to Yemen, east to
Pakistan and as far north as Kazakhstan.16 Consequently, a series of
cascading events increased American military entanglement in the region,
despite such a presence increasing local and ideological grievances. Osama
Bin Laden specifically decried the presence of United States military forces
near the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1990, later issuing a
“Declaration of Jihad” against the United States in 1996.17 Moreover, while
Bin Laden staged numerous attacks against the United States and her
interests during the 1990s, the spectacle of 9/11 finally forced the hand of
the American foreign policy establishment. This compelled American
leadership to commit significant resources to the pursuit of al-Qaeda and
similar groups, all while seeking regime change in non-compliant states.
American involvement in the greater Middle East and the perpetual war
against terrorism became a function of gradual American commitments
expressed in three propositions:
First, American immersion in the Middle East is not a story of a
great nation blindly throwing itself into a morass. Instead,
American leadership decided the Middle East was important
because energy disruptions had domestic ramifications, while 9/11
gave the necessary political impetus to engage in shadowy wars
across the Middle East.18 The United States was not particularly
concerned with the type of governments in the region, but with the
degree to which those governments adhered to some form of the
Washington Consensus and the free-flow of natural resources.19
American leadership does not see the Middle East as important in
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and of itself, and the policies of most presidential administrations
reflect this notion. Instead, losing the region to non-capitalists is a
perceptual trap grounded in what domestic and international
audiences might think. Hence, decades of involvement in the region
have made American involvement unavoidable and more
complicated. Each administration has inherited diplomatic baggage
that has continued to accumulate since FDR. Commitments to the
perceived necessity of the region for economic and military
purposes have deepened obligations to the region, which ironically,
undermines American long-term goals.
Second, the myopic pursuit of rapid military victories in Iraq and
Afghanistan undermined the true measure of success: Political
stability. Decisions made in both conflicts demonstrate how
American leadership only wanted to do enough to win militarily,
while hoping for political success with minimal resource
commitments. A lack of strategic outlays and resources has made
political victory in the region elusive. The battles still playing out in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya—to name a few—only further reiterate the
harsh reality that the United States is great at winning tactically,
but terrible at winning strategically. The inability of the United
States and its regional allies to keep a pro-American Yemeni
government propped up is indicative of the structural and societal
forces preventing the United States from getting its way.
Third, each presidential administration appears to have known the
consequences of committing military forces and other assistance,
while filtering information and selectively sharing with domestic
audiences in hopes of maintaining support, giving the illusion of
perseverance. The worst aspect of this component is that American
leadership appears to know that their proposed strategies will not
result in victory, but know that the sort of policies needed to win do
not seem sellable to the American public. Therefore, instead of
committing what is required or completely disengaging, national
security elites create a middle-road policy. This results in an overreliance on technology and limited numbers of specialized ground
forces to fight low-risk wars.20
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Ends: “Freedom will be defended”
Each administration that committed resources to the Middle East did so
with open eyes and intent, all with unwavering commitment and will for
success. Unlike what Andrew Bacevich suggested about the Carter
Doctrine in 1980 as a turning point for American foreign policy, each
successive administration from FDR to Carter to George W. Bush and
Barack Obama knew and understood the consequences of involvement in
the Middle East for energy security purposes.21 Along the way, each
administrations’ decision was path dependent, forcing the United States
down a narrower path of policy options in the Middle East, with American
leadership touting democratic principles, while simultaneously supporting
some of the least free regimes in the world.22 In many ways, it was more
desirable to create compliant regimes rather than legitimate governments.
Within hours of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and
Washington, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “freedom itself was
attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be defended”
adding “the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for
these cowardly acts.”23 One might question what sort of freedom needed
defending. If by freedom Bush meant more democracy and societal
openness for allies in the Middle East, his actions thereafter—arguably—
did not support this. The sort of freedom Bush meant was ensuring the
uninterrupted oil trade in the Persian Gulf; this is a more plausible
justification given American actions in the region post-9/11. Alternatively,
perhaps rather than a veiled cover for an underlying intent, he simply—
and superficially—meant the United States served as the world’s beacon of
freedom and was not intimidated into submission. Regardless of meaning,
do not blame Bush per se for such realpolitik. The British had purposefully
foisted the problem of maintaining Middle East security on the FDR
administration, sowing the seeds for deeper Persian Gulf commitment by
each successive administration and thus, arguably, necessitating Bush’s
immediate post-attack rhetoric.24
In 1943, after several years of vigorous British politicking, FDR
proclaimed, “I find the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the
United States.”25 Towards the end of Second World War, FDR further
acknowledged this need for oil and security in the region (to include the
eventual creation of a Jewish state) when he met the Saudi king on his ship
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at Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal.26 Shortly thereafter, Truman felt
compelled to push the creation of the Israeli state—despite allied Arab
state objections—under the pretense of securing domestic support from
Jewish-Americans.27 Witnessing the decision making process on Israel and
Palestine from within the administration, Secretary of State George C.
Marshall remarked, “an effective solution would probably please neither
the Arab nor Israel governments.”28 Marshall was right then, and still is
today.
When the Eisenhower administration had to choose between close NATO
allies—UK and France—and Egypt during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower
sided with the latter for two reasons. Eisenhower despised European
colonialism and the Suez Canal carried 1.5 million barrels of oil daily.29
While his decision temporarily soured American relations with the UK and
France, not to mention Israel, it did cease the prospect of significant
European meddling in the region.30 Better or for worse, the future of
Middle Eastern security deepened American entanglement in the region.
After Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy formalized security ties with Israel, to
which the State Department protested that this “special relationship in
national security matters…would destroy the delicate balance we seek to
maintain” in Middle Eastern relations.31 The Lyndon B. Johnson
administration further cemented this relationship with Israel during the
Arab-Israeli War and after.32 Unfortunately, this American-Israeli military
alliance is now a fundamental component in vilifying the United States in
Islamic extremist propaganda.33 The appearance of unrelenting American
support to Israel merely feeds terrorist grievances and recruiting. 34
Richard Nixon’s time in office showed the limits of Israeli support in the
face of oil costs, as Dr. Henry Kissinger engaged in shuttle diplomacy,
reducing tensions and adding a modicum of delicate stability to the Middle
Eastern region.35 At the same time though, Nixon saw the damage that oil
fluctuations had on the American economy, and forewarned the possibility
of an “American military intervention to protect vital oil supplies.”36
Gerald Ford followed up the Nixon-Kissinger stability pact by essentially
engaging in security clientelism with Israel and moderate Arab states. The
United States committed billions of dollars annually to these countries for
the purposes of “their survival against extremist pressures” internally and
externally.37 The Ford administration essentially bought off the Middle
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East region in hopes of a long-term economic play that would prevent
another disruptive oil shock. This monetary commitment set up the
Jimmy Carter administration to not only formally commit the United
States to defend the region militarily, but such beliefs translated into an
increased bureaucratic focus on the Persian Gulf and engagement in the
domestic affairs of neighboring powers.38 Within two years of his
proclamation, the U.S. military deployed to the Sinai for peacekeeping.
Task Force Sinai remains there to this day and has been the focus of
numerous attacks by local radical Islamist militias since 2015.39
Ronald Reagan bore the brunt of the decisions made by previous
administrations when he took command in the early 1980s, as antiAmerican sentiment grew in the region. This era exhibited the beginnings
of anti-American Islamic terrorism, due to perceptions of unfair American
support for Israel. Reagan bungled numerous decisions in the Middle East,
including the ill-fated deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon for
peacekeeping (over 200 American troops were killed), funding and
supporting Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan, selling weapons to Iran
(the so-called Iran-Contra Affair), and complicity supporting Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.40 The Iran-Iraq war later
expanded into attacks against ships carrying oil in the Gulf, known as the
Tanker War. The Reagan decade ended with the George H.W. Bush
administration militarily responding to Iraq’s inadvertent challenge to the
Carter doctrine.
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to secure the Rumaila oil fields, and
the looming threat of Saddam Hussein pushing into Saudi Arabia to seize
more oil fields, Bush responded with massive military force in conjunction
with a broad international coalition of 39 nations.41 The logic went that
stability was preferred to regime change as the Bush administration and
his coalition saw no reason to remove Saddam Hussein. Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney prophetically declared in 1991:
If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam
Hussein, you have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got
Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not
clear what kind of government you would put in place
of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be
a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime?42
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Ironically, in 2003 the George W. Bush administration forgot Cheney’s
logical advice. After the Persian Gulf War, Hussein remained in charge of
Iraq, serving as a counterbalance to Iranian power, while Operation
Northern Watch and Southern Watch kept him boxed in. Such long-term
military commitments led to the permanent stationing of significant U.S.
military assets in the region, all in the name of preventing future Iraqi
aggression while ensuring the free flow of oil. Thus, the U.S. military found
itself gradually developing large military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman.
William J. Clinton inherited the post-Persian Gulf War security
framework, with a large contingent of American troops permanently
assigned to the region, ebbing and flowing between 5,000 to 25,000
troops with an annual cost of $12 billion.43 At the same time, Clinton tried
to forge a peaceful resolution between Israel and Palestine, while Bin
Laden responded to the American presence in the Persian Gulf by
attacking the United States and her interests.44 As George W. Bush was
inaugurated in 2001, top officials in U.S. security and intelligence agencies
were making the case for an escalation in anti-terror operations and
preparation because of the numerous indicators showing spectacular
attacks against the United States were imminent, yet they were ignored as
just another threat.45 Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration, in
response to the attacks of 9/11, would embolden the American foreign
policy machinery to believe it could—without consequence—aggressively
eliminate any authoritarian leader in the Middle East that did not play by
the Washington playbook.

Means: “I encourage you all to go shopping”
Fighting a Global War on Terror requires a different kind of sacrifice not
seen in previous American conflicts. It means convincing the public to
forego its care and concern for a war over there, and instead worry about
economic issues while an all-volunteer force engages in worldwide
counterterrorism operations. During the Persian Gulf War, the American
public noticed the impact of war mobilization as a total of 697,000 U.S.
troops served during the short conflict, with a notable contingent of Guard
and Reserve forces called up.46 These actions were in sharp contrast to the
Vietnam War, where the United States used the Reserves for symbolic
9
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reasons—such as the response to the Pueblo incident and the Tet
Offensive.47 The wars in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003present) have put significant strain on the American military, as almost
half of all forces deployed come from Guard and Reserve units, which is a
large divergence from the minimal level of mobilization during the Persian
Gulf War and the almost absent use of such forces during the Vietnam
War.48
In the midst of the Iraqi Civil War of 2006, George W. Bush held a press
conference concerning the economy, the war in Iraq, and on terror. Bush
mentioned:
The unemployment rate has remained low at 4.5
percent. The recent report on retail sales shows a
strong beginning to the holiday shopping season
across the country. And I encourage you all to go
shopping more.49
In that press conference, he mentioned Iraq 53 times, terror 7 times, and
the economy 13 times. He did not mention Afghanistan once. While not
indicative of a myopic view of the perpetual war against terrorism, it does
cynically represent that the shopping more attitude mattered more than
dealing with the complex issue of Afghanistan. Worse yet, the civil war in
Afghanistan that year had been the deadliest ever due to a resurgent
Taliban.50
Many saw the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 as the
easiest and cheapest way to topple the regime. American Special Forces
and CIA operatives linked up with friendly warlords throughout
Afghanistan and gathered intelligence on Taliban activities to inform
subsequent conventional operations. Shortly thereafter in November 2001,
about 1,000 Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit under the
command of (then) Brigadier General James Mattis became the first
conventional forces in Afghanistan. After a successful 75th Ranger
Regiment operation to establish a forward operating base in southwest
Afghanistan known as Camp Rhino, the Marines assumed control of the
base. Camp Rhino was the first United States base established in
Afghanistan and served as the foundation for the entire ground war to
follow. From Camp Rhino, the Marines seized Kandahar International
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Airport—which then became the first U.S. air base in the country. This
enabled the introduction of follow-on forces to support the rapidly
expanding ground effort. Within three months of the initial deployment,
about 1,300 troops from the United States and U.K., in conjunction with
American airpower, dismantled the Taliban regime and pushed them out
of the major cities and into the uncontrolled AfPak foothills.51 The
problem with this military victory was that it was incomplete, as much of
the Taliban leadership escaped into Pakistan. Thus, the Taliban escape
resulted in a hollow American military victory that failed to achieve any
broader strategic objectives; a political victory in Afghanistan remains
elusive to this day.
The experience of a quick victory on the cheap would provide evidence to
some in the Bush administration that modern wars could now be won
through limited numbers of troops.52 High-tech equipment and airpower
in the hands of a small number of Special Forces appeared incredibly
decisive, leading many to believe this Afghan Model to be a plausible
alternative to the sort of expensive conventional air-land campaign waged
in the Persian Gulf War.53 Still, the perception that conventional troops
and technology wins wars pervades much of the foreign policy elite circles
in the Washington Beltway, much as it had during the Vietnam War.54
With the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, the initial force of 130,000
U.S. troops and 30,000 other coalition troops quickly routed formal Iraqi
security forces within 21 days.55 Almost immediately, Iraqi generals with
numerous floppy disks in hand (files containing the names and
information of about 125,000 reliable Iraqi troops) met with American
Generals and officials to set-up a transitory security force that could be
trusted in a post-Saddam Iraq.56 The Iraqi military leadership had hoped
that the Americans would be amicable to Iraqis taking care of their own
safety and security almost immediately. However, Paul Bremer, the acting
Chief Executive Authority for Iraq enacted a harsh de-Baathification
program, which immediately left half a million angry personnel from the
military and civil service unemployed.57 This was an environment ripe for
insurgency: Hundreds of thousands of young men with military experience
were jobless, hopeless, and under occupation. While there is speculation
that Bremer was compelled to make the decision by those within the Bush
inner circle, a prominent Iraqi Shia cleric (Ayatollah Sistani) exerted
significant pressure on Bremer to disband Iraq’s military.58 In this case,
11
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Shia leaders were concerned that Iraq would become a de facto Sunni
military regime.
The initial military victories of Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in numerous
ideological missteps, and conditions quickly worsened in both countries.
For example, about 5,500 American troops occupied Afghanistan in 2002,
but by the end of 2003, that number had doubled.59 Not surprisingly, an
internal memo from Richard Haass in 2002 identified the success of the
United States in Afghanistan, and that it could be a good model on how to
guide reconstruction in Iraq.60 Similarly, 67,700 troops occupied Iraq in
2003; however, the loss of stability led to American troop levels doubling
by the end of 2004. At the peak of U.S. military occupations, Afghanistan
had about 63,500 troops in 2012, and Iraq had about 187,000 troops in
2008.61 In both cases, American political leaders had hoped for too much
with a limited amount of resources committed, ignoring the lack of
institutional capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq.
While security and governance issues plagued both countries during
American occupation, Afghanistan had been a failed state for decades if
not centuries, while Iraq fell apart due to the mismanagement of the
country after the war.62 Such mismanagement by American and Iraqi
government officials inadvertently created the Islamic State. Iraqi Prime
Minister, Nouri al-Maliki followed the withdrawal of American troops in
2011 by personalizing the army and politicizing other security forces.63
This alienated many of the Sunnis in western Iraq, leading to the rise of
the Islamic State, which required the U.S. military to redeploy to Iraq in
2014 to protect Baghdad. Interestingly, the 70,000 Sunni insurgents paid
off (during the Anbar Awakening of 2006) to not fight the U.S. military
during The Surge of 2007, eventually found employment with the Islamic
State due to Maliki trying to isolate them from power when the Americans
left.64 Afghanistan is no better: some Afghan security commanders rent
their equipment and loan their personnel to the Taliban.65 Despite such
American entanglement, it is difficult for the U.S. leaders to force political
leadership in these weak states to choose policies that contribute to longterm stability. Worse, the United States continues providing substantial
military aid to Iraq and Afghan security forces, creating nothing more than
Fabergé Egg armies: Expensive but easily broken by insurgents.66

12
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1771

Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East

Expectations: “We're not winning; we're not losing”
There is a serious issue when American leadership believes it can fight a
war on the cheap. Such expectations are due to a mixture of politics and
ideology. The George W. Bush administration made decisions on the
number of military deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq based on avoiding
domestic economic impacts. Troop levels perceived as too high would have
made his administration and the Republican Party politically vulnerable to
the cost of the wars, measured in both blood and treasure. Sadly,
Afghanistan and Iraq required more resources and a strategic timeline
longer than the foreign policy machinery wanted to admit. Consider how
well American post-Second World War occupation worked in Japan, Italy,
and Germany, or the sizeable contingent of American troops that have
remained in South Korea since the Korean War. Proper post-conflict
occupations may not be as ostentatious as combat operations, but they do
require significant long-term political commitments, which can be a
difficult pill to swallow for a domestic audience. To this day large and
consistent troop contingents remain stationed in Germany, Italy, Japan,
and Korea. American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, by
comparison, have ebbed and flowed without supporting a reasonable endstate of long-term stability in each country. Despite persistent strategic
ambiguity, it appears increasingly evident that the leaders of these
countries know that the United States and international community will
subsidize further mismanagement of their nations.
After five years of combat operations in Afghanistan and three years in
Iraq, George W. Bush came to terms with his strategic struggles. Bush
admitted in 2006 “we're not winning, we're not losing,” adding “we need
to reset our military” in response to claims that it was stressed. Bush also
noted, “we're going to need a military that's capable of being able to
sustain our efforts and to help us achieve peace” in the fight against
Islamic extremists.67 Bush finally made such comments despite numerous
warnings from politicians and officials that there were not enough troops
or resources dedicated to stabilizing both countries.68 At the same time,
the Bush response in both countries was already too little, too late, a
similar sentiment echoed at the end of the Vietnam War.69
The lackluster concern for fielding enough troops for Afghanistan and Iraq
was built on the perception and premise that these wars needed to
13
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minimize impact on the American way of life and economy, which
struggled in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, for ideological
reasons, George W. Bush was committed to his tax cut promise for two
reasons—even when the economy began flailing. First, a 2001 Heritage
Foundation report supported the Bush tax cuts because it was believed
that this would lead to increased tax revenue generation; eliminating the
national debt by 2010.70 This was ideologically misguided unfortunately,
as the U.S. national debt reached $14 trillion by the end of 2010.71 Second,
Bush was heavily influenced by his father’s experience with tax policy.
George H.W. Bush reneged on the “read-my-lips, no-new-taxes” promise
in 1990, as he pragmatically chose to balance the budget.72 Many, and
George W. Bush especially, saw this decision as a critical mistake, leading
to his father’s failed re-election bid.73 Thus, George W. Bush attempted to
juggle the economy and a war on terror, while making reelection a top
priority.
When it came to proposing funding for the 2003 Iraq War, the Bush
administration estimated it would cost a mere $50-60 billion, with
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld predicting a need for no more than
145,000 troops for the invasion and post-stability operations.74 Yet the
Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, pushed back against those
estimates. Shinseki told Congress that any coalition would need “several
hundred thousand soldiers” to control the security situation after the
defeat of Iraqi forces.75 The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz,
would later reprimand Shinseki for going against Pentagon estimates
pushed by Bush administration appointees. Instead, Wolfowitz proclaimed
that Iraq war cost estimates ranged from $10 billion to $100 billion and
that the effort required approximately 100,000 troops.76 Bush even fired
his economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, for suggesting that the Iraq War
might cost as much as $200 billion.77 Compare such initial estimates to the
cruel fact that the war in Iraq cost $1.7 trillion.78 This figure continues to
grow in light of the American commitment to fight the Islamic State, and
the medical costs of long-term care for troops injured fighting in Iraq.
Thus, this internal politicking within the Bush administration indicates
that they likely worried more about avoiding disruptions to U.S. society
and its economy than truly trying to win each war with enough resources
that many experts had suggested.
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The rapid initial victories in Afghanistan and Iraq also led many military
and political leaders to believe that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
had occurred; enabling the U.S. military to technologically overcome any
enemy with minimal amounts of troops.79 The foreign policy bureaucracy
preferred RMA due to its low-risk warfare approach, such as airpower and
Special Forces, juxtaposed to riskier—from a public relations perspective—
use of boots on the ground to fight Iraqi and Afghan insurgents. Such a
belief in technological superiority leading to victory has been woven in the
fabric of the war-making bureaucracy since at least the Vietnam War.
Bernard Fall first astutely identified this American form of warfighting in
1961 in Street without Joy. Commenting on United States and French
involvement in French Indochina, Fall stated, “The West is still battling an
ideology with technology.”80 He added that the Americans, much like their
French predecessors, over-relied on their technological advantage to avoid
addressing “the woeful lack of popular support and political savvy”
involved with propping up an unpopular South Vietnamese government.81
Such over-dependence on technology means that killing the enemy
becomes the primary metric for success, because it is difficult to quantify
military impact on an insurgency, let alone kill it. Winning in this
subjective arena is much more difficult for a military with shortened time
horizons. Westernized militaries are not designed to mend the sort of
political solutions required in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the idea
that superior technology and firepower wins wars is a fallacy propagated
by defense hawks and weapons contractors who are often ignorant to
military engagements of the past.
Steven Biddle’s award-winning 2004 book Military Power shows us that
force employment—or the “doctrine and tactics by which forces are
actually used in combat”—is a better and more reliable determinant of
combat success or failure relative to technology, materiel, and gross
numerical strength.82 Yet, despite this modern account of how militaries
are actually employed in combat, the United States still overestimates its
advantage, underestimates its enemies, and entrenches itself in sustained
conflicts with seemingly no clearly defined and achievable end-state.
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A Way Forward?
The adventurous military campaigns and entanglement in the greater
Middle East region have imposed significant economic and human costs.
At the expense of American education, infrastructure, and energy security,
the Americans directed an overwhelming amount of resources and mental
effort towards the region over almost two decades with little to show for it.
It is less stable and no freer. Current estimates put the total cost of these
wars in the greater Middle East region at $4.7 trillion and climbing. 83 Such
pursuits have all been charged to the American credit card.84 The irony
inherent in these costly pursuits of stability and energy security in the
Middle East is that such funds could have been better spent on
contributing to the United States pursuit of domestic energy
independence, thus lessening energy dependence on the Persian Gulf.85
Perhaps it is fitting that during Barack Obama’s tenure, when given the
choice between massive escalation and disengagement, he chose a third
rail: Forcing Middle Eastern countries to resolve their own problems with
minimal American assistance. When pressure on his administration
compelled Obama to keep U.S. combat troops in Iraq after 2011, he
decided against keeping a sizeable military contingent due to the Iraqi
parliament denying immunity in the new Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) in a post-2011 Iraq.86 Such a decision by the Iraqi government
hamstrung Obama, especially since George W. Bush had penned the 2008
SOFA treaty promising to remove American troops at the end of 2011.87
Had Obama kept forces after 2011, American troops could have faced
prosecution for possible crimes in Iraqi courts, a judicial system that
Human Rights Watch called a “broken justice system.”88 While some
could criticize Obama for not doing enough to convince Iraq to allow a
residual American force to remain after 2011 with SOFA immunity, the
Iraqi government can be the face of more criticism for marginalizing
Sunnis after 2011, which ignited the Islamic State movement in
conjunction with a failing Syrian state.89
Obama’s announcement about the symbolic end to the war on terror in
2013 was indicative of his desire to decouple the U.S. military from the
problems of the greater Middle East region.90 This change, however, for
the foreign policy machinery is the equivalent of trying to move
mountains. Practically nothing changed after 2013, and as the Islamic
16
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1771

Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East

State came to power, it required a return by the United States to impose
security. Indeed, the gambler’s fallacy even plays in strongly, as the United
States has invested immense resources in creating a network of substantial
military bases throughout the region, and creating a complex web of
foreign military relationships. Worse yet, American politicians overplay
and overhype threats from the region to stoke their political base and be
elected.
Yet against all odds, as indicated in Jeff Goldberg’s The Atlantic piece on
the “The Obama Doctrine,” Obama no longer perceived the Middle East as
important to future American interests. He cynically concluded that
American military power had little chance of making the region better or
more stable. Similarly, Obama questioned why the United States should
subsidize the military advantage held by the Israeli military. He also
addressed the role of Sunni regimes inciting anti-American sentiments.91
Conceivably, it is no surprise that Obama hesitantly and timidly deployed
military force in Libya, and still saw some of his fears come true, leading to
greater trepidation in how to employ military force in the Syrian civil war.
Perhaps the foreign policy bureaucracy was threatened by Obama’s macrolevel and longitudinal understanding of the cultural and structural
changes that are constraining the Middle East. Obama reluctantly
concluded that hard military power alone could not solve such problems.
Only time will tell if the legacy of Obama will be, per his critics, that “he is
not a realist, but an isolationist with drones and special-operations
forces.”92
Nevertheless, Obama’s attempt to steer away from the greater Middle East
region will be the lasting memory of his foreign policy legacy; attempting
to dig America out of the British inspired rabbit hole dug for FDR and
successive presidents. With over three years in office, President Donald J.
Trump seems to have returned to a pre-Obama Middle East policy, which
aligns closely with the Pentagon’s institutional preference for a
securitization of problems. The Trump administration wants to increase
defense spending substantially while significantly cutting the State
Department budget.93 This will upgrade the hammer of American power to
a golden plated sledgehammer.
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Obama’s attempts to reduce commitments to the region will likely be a
speed bump when viewed from the longue durée by historians. Critics saw
Trump’s deployment of Marines to Syria as the latest escalation in an
untenable and unwinnable situation lacking a solution and exit strategy.
The introduction of conventional ground forces into Syrian territory—
according to media pundits—indicated a return to pre-Obama policies.94
Yet in the latest irony of ironies, Trump’s announcement December 2018
to withdraw about 2,000 U.S. troops from Syria is seen by the same critics
as uninformed and apathetic to the potential destabilizing effects it may
bring to the country and region.95 Defense Secretary James Mattis
resigned his post over misaligned views with President Trump on the
United States approach to allies, malign actors, and strategic competitors.
Mattis’ resignation generated discourse that further supports the central
claim to this article: The inertia and momentum of war is too great to stop.
This takes us back to the Trump administration that again reversed course
in August 2019 committing U.S. troops to the creation of a Syrian safe
zone with the Turkish military.96
After almost two decades of sustained American combat operations in the
Middle East, one might rightly think the announcement of troop
withdrawal from Syria would be welcomed—even refreshing—news in the
public narrative. Despite this, the conscious and subconscious militaryindustrial complex has fired back with criticism of the move. There is
resistance to withdrawal in the military and Congressional circles. The
inertia of war continues today as it did during Vietnam, informed and
influenced by longstanding policies, traditions, and precedent. To this end,
the appointment of ideological war hawks, such as John Bolton as the
National Security Advisor, reinforce this trend back towards the status quo
of believing that American military power can simply conduct regime
changes effortlessly.97 Moreover, it suggests that states might be more
broadly labeled as terrorists, such as Iran, possibly leading to a military
confrontation with Iran for its support of various Shia militias, such as the
Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other groups in the Middle East and Africa.98
Conclusion
If history is doomed to repeat itself with the way America once supported
notable insurgents, such as Ho Chi Minh and Bin Laden, then there is no
doubt that some of these American backed rebels in Syria and Iraq will be
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future nemeses in 20 years. The only reasonable question left is how much
will the DOD continue the securitization of the greater Middle East region
without a strategy resembling the Marshall Plan?
Under the Trump administration, the Middle East system appears
successful for the time being. The bad guys are familiar to the good guys,
and the apparatuses are in place to fight them. The political constituency
in the United States is ostensibly happy that the gloves are off in the fight
against the Islamic State and similar armed groups. The Trump
administration appears to have given the U.S. military more autonomy in
conducting its wars than any other president in recent history.99 The oil
continues to flow, and gasoline prices remain reasonable and stable in the
United States However, this all comes at the expense of a rise in national
debt as taxes are cut, and hundreds of billions are borrowed from other
countries (such as China) to maintain an over-sized military that permits a
foreign policy to operate with short-time horizons. Strategy, instead of the
potential change to consider a bigger picture as intended by Obama,
instead reverts to the past 70-year repetitive cycle of what seems to work.
The only question is will this symbolic strategy against terrorism in the
Middle East eventually succeed? Alternatively, will the ghost of Vietnam
and its failed strategy haunt the United States for decades to come?
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